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We study how incentive conflicts known as ‘career concerns’ can gen-
erate inefficiencies not only within firms but also in market outcomes.
Career concerns may lead agents to avoid actions that, while value-
increasing in expectation, could potentially be associated with a bad
outcome. We apply this theory to natural gas procurement by regu-
lated public utilities and show that career concerns may lead to a
reduction in surplus-increasing market transactions during periods
when the benefits of trade are likely to be greatest. We show that data
from natural gas markets are consistent with this prediction and diffi-
cult to explain using alternative theories.
I. INTRODUCTION
ONE OF THE CENTRAL PROBLEMS THAT MANAGERS AND REGULATORS FACE arises
when they must rely on agents, whose efforts and abilities are imperfectly
observable, to choose actions that will advance the manager’s or regulator’s
goals. The usual solution when efforts and abilities are unobservable is to
reward agents on the basis of observable outcomes. As Holmstrom [1982/
1999] discusses, an important question is how to design a mechanism based
on outcomes that will motivate an agent to undertake the level of risk that
is optimal from the principal’s point of view. There is more than one
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possible impediment. One classic reason why an agent may undertake
insufficient risk is that he or she is simply more risk averse over income than
the principal is. If this is the case, then an incentive scheme that rewards
an agent as a linear function of the principal’s payoffs will result in less
risk-taking than the principal would prefer.
Holmstrom describes a second reason for an agent to undertake insuffi-
cient risk that does not hinge on risk aversion over income: ‘career con-
cerns.’ Career concerns arise when agents differ in their levels of ability and
when long-term rewards (such as compensation, retention or promotion)
depend not only on the outcomes of the agents’ actions but also on what the
principal infers from those outcomes about the agents’ underlying levels
of ability.
Examples in which rewards are based only on outcomes (and are there-
fore not influenced by career concerns) include sales commissions or any
kind of piece-rate compensation. In these cases, agents are paid on the basis
of output and the principal makes no attempt to assess how hard the agent
worked or how skilled he or she is. In contrast, there are many examples in
which career concerns arise because rewards depend on ex post inferences
rather than on explicit functions of output alone. Consider, for example,
the tenure review process for assistant professors. While more and better
publications will help a professor receive tenure, there are generally no
explicit contracts that specify how many papers of what quality will guar-
antee tenure. Instead, the tenure decision depends in large part on the
senior faculty’s inference about the candidate based on the candidate’s
output and observable actions.
A key insight of Holmstrom’s is that if agents recognize that their
rewards depend in part on the principal’s ex post inference, then they may
try to manipulate the principal’s formation of that inference. Considering
an agent delegated to make investment decisions, Holmstrom concludes
that he will not prefer the investment opportunities that have the highest
expected payoffs but instead those that ‘leave him protected by exogenous
reasons for failure’ (Holmstrom [1982/1999], p. 179 in 1999 version). Said
another way, the agent ‘will take less risk, because of a concern for the
negative talent evaluation that follows upon failure’ (Holmstrom [1982/
1999] p. 180 in 1999 version).
Career concerns have since been discussed in a variety of contexts in
the economics literature. Scharfstein and Stein [1990] point to inference
manipulation as a reason for managers to mimic the investment decisions
of others (‘follow the herd’). Brandenburger and Polak [1996] show that
decision-makers whose rewards depend in part on what an outside observer
(‘the market’) thinks of the decision will ignore their own contrary private
information in order to choose what the market thinks is correct, a phe-
nomenon they call ‘covering your posteriors.’ Prendergast and Stole [1996]
show that agents may distort the degree to which they appear to learn from
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new information in order to distort the inferences drawn by their principals.
Harbaugh [2006] shows that an agent will avoid gambles in which a loss has
the potential to reveal poor judgment. Finally, Chevalier and Ellison [1999]
show empirically that the portfolio choices of mutual fund managers and
their promotion and retention outcomes are consistent with a career
concerns model.
Business practitioners also recognize this phenomenon. During the
1980’s, a period in which IBM dominated the emerging personal computer
market, this behavior was embodied in a phrase that was known by every
corporate purchasing agent: ‘No one ever got fired for buying IBM.’
Taking the risk of purchasing a different brand of PC was seen as having
tangible downside for the purchasing agent if the alternative machine
performed poorly and little upside if it resulted in overall cost savings.
In this paper, we aim to extend this aspect of the principal-agent litera-
ture by examining empirically the impact of career concerns not only on the
firm but also in the market when many firms make decisions this way. Such
impacts could arise in many situations, given the wide array of settings
in which career concerns potentially apply. To date, studies examining the
broader impacts of career concerns have focused on financial markets,
showing that career concerns can exacerbate credit cycles (Rajan [1994]),
preclude information revelation (Dasgupta and Prat [2008]), and amplify
the impact of financial shocks on bond prices (Guerrieri and Kondor
[2009]). In contrast, we examine markets for a physical good—natural
gas—over which firms hold private valuations. We find that career con-
cerns in this setting reduce firms’ incentives to undertake transactions,
distorting market prices and resulting in a loss of surplus-increasing trade.
We focus on the gas procurement decisions of regulated gas utilities
(local distribution companies). Regulators, who are the principals in this
context, want utilities, who are the agents, to minimize their costs so as to
minimize ultimately the costs to ratepayers, but at the same time they want
utilities to ensure service quality by avoiding service curtailments. We argue
that career concerns in this setting are manifest at the firm level as inaction
in forward wholesale markets: utilities will avoid transactions that could
lead regulators to conclude that the utility was to blame for negative
outcomes such as high procurement costs or service failures.1 In our model,
utilities may receive only a noisy signal of whether they should sell or
purchase gas in forward markets. We argue that even if a utility believes
that selling gas in the forward market is the better decision in expectation,
it may instead make no forward transaction if there is a possibility that it
will later need to re-purchase gas at a very high price on the spot market
or be forced to curtail customers. The need for high-cost spot market
1 In other contexts, career concerns can lead to inefficiently high levels of effort, rather than
inaction.
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procurement may still arise should the utility not undertake a forward
transaction; however, in this case the utility will be able to blame its
inaction on exogenous market forces because local natural gas markets
are occasionally illiquid. That is, the utility will be able to claim that it
attempted to purchase gas on the forward market but was thwarted by
illiquidity. The utility cannot make this argument if it actually sold gas
during the forward market, since it will have revealed itself as having
adjusted inventories in the (ex post) wrong direction. Thus, inaction is a
means for the utility to protect itself from revealing a mistake in judgment.
When multiple utilities are affected by career concerns and display a
resulting preference for inaction, the efficiency of wholesale markets may
be adversely affected. In particular, in ‘tight’ markets in which demand is
high and the threat of extremely high spot prices and even curtailments is
salient, inaction will lead to a reduction in the volume of forward trans-
actions and a forward price premium. In this way, career concerns that
operate within a firm can spill over to have implications for market out-
comes. In our context, the implication is that efforts on the part of agents
to influence principals’ inferences can distort markets by eliminating
Pareto-improving trades. Moreover, this distortion occurs at the times
when the potential gains from trade are likely to be greatest.
The data and our empirical analysis do not permit a direct test of career
concerns. Rather, we use market-level data from more than 100 local gas
markets between 1993 and 2008 to establish two empirical regularities:
forward price premia increase and forward trading volumes fall in tight
markets. These two regularities are consistent with our model of career
concerns, and we argue that they are not well-explained by a standard
model of forward markets. Thus, our tests of career concerns are indirect.
Unfortunately, firm-level data on transactions are not available, so we
cannot observe individual actions within a firm that could yield more
compelling evidence of career concerns, nor can we investigate inter-firm
differences in incentives or organization. Within the standard model of
forward markets, we do consider two factors that could drive some of the
market outcomes we observe, namely price risk aversion and ‘security of
supply’ concerns (i.e., stockout risk). We conclude that, given the institu-
tions of the natural gas market, these factors could create a forward price
premium, but neither could explain the decline in forward market trading
volumes that we find occur when the market is tight. Here again our
inference is indirect. While we consider what we think are the most likely
alternative explanations, there could be other alternative theories that are
consistent with one or both of our empirical findings.
In what follows, we first present in section II a simple, general model that
formalizes the idea that career concerns can lead to inaction and then relate
the model to the context of natural gas procurement. Section III describes
the relevant institutional details of the natural gas industry and the specific
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incentives for inaction in tight markets. Section IV discusses the impacts of
inaction on market performance and derives market-level empirical impli-
cations. Section IV also describes several alternative mechanisms that
might generate similar empirical predictions in these markets. Sections V
and VI describe, respectively, our data and empirical approach. Section VII
presents our empirical results and discusses the extent to which the esti-
mated results support either career concerns or alternatives as explana-
tions for what we observe. Section VIII concludes and discusses broader
implications.
II. A MODEL OF CAREER CONCERNS AND INACTION
II(i). The Model
This section presents a simple principal-agent model that demonstrates
how career concerns may lead to inaction. In the model, some agents will
prefer to take no action rather than take an action that increases the
principal’s value in expectation but potentially reveals the agent to be of the
type the principal finds less desirable.2
Consider a risk-neutral principal that would like in each period to maxi-
mize a scalar value Vt = btqt, where qt is a choice variable qt ∈ {-1,0,1} and
bt is a random variable with mean zero that is continuously distributed on
γ γ,⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ , where γ γ< <0 .
The principal cannot observe bt directly before having to choose qt, but
the principal employs a risk-neutral agent whose job it is to know bt in each
period and to choose qt in order to maximize Vt. Each period, the agent
receives compensation equal to some share of Vt, including when Vt is
negative. Since the probability is zero that bt = 0, it will always be optimal
from the principal’s perspective to have a well-informed agent choose either
qt = 1 or qt = -1. Some share of the time, a, however, the agent is forced by
exogenous circumstances to choose qt = 0, which might be thought of as
taking no action since it guarantees Vt = 0. The principal cannot verify in
any given instance whether the agent has been forced to choose qt = 0 or has
done so voluntarily.
There are two possible types of agents. Agents know their types, but an
agent’s type is unobservable to the principal. Type A agents always get a
perfect signal of bt and, given their incentives, choose the optimal qt. Type
B agents get a perfect signal of bt with probability r (0 < r < 1 and uncor-
related with b). With probability 1-r they get a noisy signal, βˆ. The noisy
signal is unbiased, E βˆ β⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ = , but has support over γ γ,⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ and can indicate
2 The model’s setup is in the spirit of Brandenburger and Polak [1996]; it differs in that it
focuses on the agent’s possible strategy of taking no action at all in order to avoid revealing
information about his or her type.
SEVERIN BORENSTEIN, MEGHAN R. BUSSE AND RYAN KELLOGG224
© 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics
the incorrect sign of b. The agent knows whether the signal it has received
is perfect or noisy. The principal knows that both type A and type B agents
exist but does not know which type its current agent is.
After each period, the principal observes bt, qt, and Vt. The principal
receives Vt and pays (or charges) the agent a share of it. The principal then
decides whether to retain or fire the agent. If the agent is fired, a new agent
is drawn from a pool of agents of both types. The probability of drawing a
type A agent is known to the principal and is strictly between zero and one.
Following the retention or firing decision, a new period begins. We assume
that the environment is changing frequently enough, the relationship
between principal and agent is short enough, or a is large enough that the
principal cannot reliably infer whether the rate at which the agent takes
action q = 0 is inconsistent with a.
This model implies the following results.
Result 1: If a type B agent wished solely to maximize the expected Vt
(no career concerns), then it would never voluntarily choose qt = 0.3
Result 2: An agent that chooses qt of the wrong sign is fully revealed to be
type B.4
Result 3: If hiring is costless, the principal should always fire an agent
revealed to be type B.5
Result 4: Depending on the type B agent’s outside employment opportunity
and discount rate, in equilibrium it may respond to an imperfect signal by
claiming, untruthfully, that it is forced to select qt = 0 that period.
The first three results follow directly from the model. Result 4 arises
because a type B agent knows that if it makes a mistake, it will be fired
immediately. When the type B agent knows that its signal is perfect, there
is no chance that it will be fired if it acts in accordance with the signal.
However, when the agent knows that its signal is imperfect, acting in
accordance with the signal will lead with a nonzero probability to a
mistake. If that probability is large enough (either because βˆ is very close
to zero or the signal is very noisy), if the agent’s outside employment
opportunities are poor enough relative to the existing contract, and if its
discount rate is low enough, then the type B agent will choose to forego the
3 Proof: When the signal is perfect, choosing qt with the same sign as bt results in Vt > 0 with
certainty. Even when the signal is imperfect, choosing qt with the same sign as βˆt results in
E[Vt] > 0.
4 Proof: Type A agents are always perfectly informed. They know which qt will maximize
Vt, and it is in their interest to choose that qt.
5 Proof: The expected value of a new draw is higher than that of a certain type B agent
because the new draw can be no worse than type B and because there is no scope for
improvement in the model.
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chance to earn the positive payment it would obtain if it chose qt correctly.6
It will instead claim that it could not choose a non-zero qt due to exogenous
factors. This inaction prevents the principal from having an opportunity to
infer that the agent is of the low-quality type.7
II(ii). Correspondence of the Model to Natural Gas Procurement
Here, we summarize the correspondence between the model and the
context of natural gas procurement before giving a more complete descrip-
tion of the institutional features of natural gas markets in section III.
The principals in the model correspond to state Public Utilities Commis-
sions (PUC’s). PUC’s have two primary objectives: (1) to ensure reliable
gas supply so that customers will not be interrupted, even during peak
demand periods; and (2) to minimize customer rates while allowing the
utility to achieve a reasonable rate of return. The agents are local distribu-
tion companies (LDC’s). LDC’s are public utilities that are responsible for
purchasing natural gas on wholesale markets and distributing that gas
through a local network of gas lines to ratepaying customers in a defined
geographic area.
The value function in the model represents the value of the LDC
adjusting its gas position for period t, i.e., making transactions to change
the amount of natural gas the LDC has available to fulfill the demand
arising from its customers in period t. The LDC’s position includes both
gas the LDC has in storage in its local distribution area and scheduled gas
deliveries arranged under long-term contracts with gas suppliers and inter-
state pipeline companies, either of which can be increased or decreased
through pre-period t transactions. The value function Vt incorporates both
the principal’s goal of service reliability and its desire for the LDC to
minimize its costs of operation and thereby minimize customer rates.
Operation costs include the costs of procuring gas, expenses associated with
holding excess reserves of gas in inventory, and opportunity costs of not
selling gas on wholesale markets.
6 The proof of this possibility result is straightforward by showing that it can’t be privately
optimal for a type B agent never to lie. Consider the case in which βˆ ε= + , arbitrarily close to
zero. The gain from choosing q  0 is arbitrarily small and the probability of being revealed
to be type B is substantial, nearly 50% if βˆ is distributed symmetrically. Under the assump-
tion that the environment is changing sufficiently frequently that the principal cannot reliably
infer whether the rate at which the agent takes action q = 0 is inconsistent with a, lying by
choosing q = 0 does not impose a risk of being fired.
7 It is important to the results that the principal not be able to commit never to fire the
agent. Since the principal in equilibrium does not learn about the agent’s type, such a
commitment would be optimal for the principal because it would eliminate the incentive of a
type B agent to choose not to act (acting always yields positive value for the principal in
expectation). Assuming that the principal cannot commit to retain the agent seems appro-
priate in our context of utility regulation and in most business settings.
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An explicit, non-stylized form of this value function would be more
difficult to specify than that of a typical profit function because the
pressures PUC’s face are political pressures rather than profit pressures.
A document called the ‘Natural Gas Information Toolkit’ published in
2008 by The National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners
describes the pressure PUC’s and LDC’s anticipated arising when summer
2008 gas prices hit record levels: ‘Social dismay could occur, especially in
cold areas of the country where households consume large amounts of
natural gas during the winter months. Gas utilities, in addition, could
experience higher bad debt and other financial problems and, along with
state commissions, would be the recipients of public wrath,’ (NARUC
[2008] p. iii). Speaking in more general terms, the Toolkit says, ‘State
commissions and gas utilities have taken the brunt of public outcries
over high gas prices. State commissions desire to have natural gas remain
affordable for all customers and priced ‘ “fairly and reasonably,” ’
(NARUC [2008] p. 2).
The value function at any point in time, Vt, dictates whether it is better
(in expectation) for the LDC to purchase or to sell gas on the wholesale
market. The job of the LDC is to know bt, using projections of customer
demand, and to act accordingly. The correct value of adjusting reserves
is revealed when demand is realized, after the procurement decision has
been made. The types of agents represent the possibility that some LDC’s
(or some individuals who are employed by LDC’s) may be better than
others at forecasting demand. The probability a that the agent is forced
to choose q = 0 corresponds to the fact that local natural gas markets are
occasionally illiquid, so that an LDC may not be able to trade without
substantially moving the price or may not be able to find a counterparty
at all.
The correspondence of the model’s results to the natural gas procure-
ment setting is that there may be instances in which the regulator’s interest
might be served best by the LDC’s either buying or selling gas; however, the
LDC would rather make no transaction than risk engaging in the wrong
transaction. This preference for inaction occurs because the LDC, if it does
nothing, can always claim ex post that it tried to do the right thing but was
thwarted by the illiquidity of the market. Alternatively, taking an action
would expose the LDC to the possibility that the action was incorrect,
in which case the regulator would be able to infer clearly that a mistake
was made.
III. NATURAL GAS PROCUREMENT AND INACTION IN ‘TIGHT’ MARKETS
This section presents the relevant details of natural gas markets and argues
that LDCs’ incentives for inaction will tend to be manifest only in ‘tight’
markets in which demand and prices are high. We also argue that the
CAREER CONCERNS, INACTION AND MARKET INEFFICIENCY 227
© 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics
incentive for inaction will tend to be asymmetric, in that LDC’s will be
more wary of making sales of gas than of making purchases.
III(i). Institutional Aspects of LDCs’ Gas Procurement Decisions
The delivery of natural gas to end-use consumers involves three stages:
production from natural gas wells, interstate transmission, and local
distribution. These three stages are handled by three different types of
companies: natural gas producers, pipeline transportation companies, and
LDC’s, respectively. A fourth set of firms, gas marketers, act as inter-
mediaries, aggregating volumes across producers (many of which are very
small firms), matching buyers and sellers, and often taking market posi-
tions themselves.
Natural gas production in the United States is generally considered to be
competitive — industry concentration amongst producers is extremely low
— and wellhead prices have been fully de-controlled since 1993.8
The areas of the country in which natural gas is produced — a belt
running northwest to southeast from the Rocky Mountains to the Gulf of
Mexico9— is not where demand centers are. Demand is concentrated in the
Northeast, Upper Midwest, and West Coast. Thus, a network of interstate
transmission pipelines has been developed. The pipeline companies are
distinct firms that do not own any natural gas themselves, but rather act as
transporters of gas on behalf of producers, LDC’s, and gas marketers. The
maximum tariffs that interstate pipelines may charge are regulated by the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) under a cost-of-service
framework.
LDC’s purchase gas on wholesale markets and deliver it to ratepaying
customers.10 Each LDC is regulated by its state’s Public Utilities Commis-
sion (PUC), which controls retail prices through cost-of-service regulation
in which the wholesale cost of gas supply is passed through to ratepayers.
Retail prices generally adjust only with a lag, giving LDC’s incentives to
reduce their natural gas purchase costs if possible. An additional incentive
is provided by the threat of a prudency review process should the PUC
believe that the LDC is paying abnormally high prices for gas. An LDC can
also expect to be reviewed if it does not procure sufficient gas supplies and
must curtail customers. (Because retail rates are regulated and do not
change on a day-to-day basis, there is little scope for end-use customer
response to high wholesale prices.)
8 Wellhead natural gas price deregulation began in 1978 with the Natural Gas Policy Act.
Prices were fully de-controlled in 1993 under the Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act.
9 About 20% of the natural gas consumed in the U.S. is imported, about 90% of which
comes from Canada.
10 Some merchant electric generators and large industrial firms also purchase gas directly in
wholesale markets.
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An LDC must make gas procurement decisions along two dimensions:
(1) how far in advance to procure; and (2) whether to take ownership of
wholesale gas at a location near its customers or at a location near gas
producers. An LDC has three options for purchase timing: it can purchase
gas through long-term contracts, through a monthly forward market called
the ‘bidweek’ market, or in a day-ahead spot market. LDC’s typically
arrange to fulfill at least some of their natural gas needs by signing long-
term contracts with natural gas marketers or relatively large producers that
do their own marketing. These contracts often have time horizons meas-
ured in years and typically include (or are paired with) a purchase of
transportation rights over the necessary pipelines to transport the natural
gas from the production location to the LDC’s distribution area.
The ‘bidweek’ market’s name derives from the fact that it occurs during
‘bidweek,’ the last five trading days of each month. As it goes into bidweek,
an LDC has a certain level of gas ‘reserves’ at its disposal to meet demand
over the upcoming month. The level of reserves is determined by its long-
term contracts and by storage carried over from the previous month. In the
bidweek market the LDC can adjust its level of reserves by buying addi-
tional gas if it thinks its reserves are inadequate or by selling reserves for
which the market price exceeds its private shadow value. Potential trans-
action partners include other LDC’s, gas marketers, and large producers.
Transactions in the bidweek market are for a specified volume of gas to be
delivered to a local market for every day of the upcoming month. Bidweek
markets operate at approximately 100 locations across the United States.
Finally, an LDC can make daily adjustments to its reserves through a
day-ahead spot market. Spot markets, like bidweek markets, are local and
provide LDC’s with an opportunity to buy or sell gas in order to match
their retail demand on a day-to-day basis.
In both the bidweek and spot markets, an LDC can carry out transac-
tions near its service area or at some distance away. Should the LDC elect
to take ownership near its customers, it must contract with a gas supplier
for delivery to its local area; in this case, the supplier is responsible for
arranging the necessary pipeline transportation. Alternatively, if the trans-
fer of ownership occurs at a distant location, the LDC is responsible for
contracting transportation. Transportation can be arranged either through
a direct contract with the pipeline company or through a contract with an
existing holder of transportation rights on the pipeline.
Market participants have indicated to us that the local bidweek and spot
markets in areas served by LDC’s are occasionally illiquid. These markets
lack a centralized market-maker, and the consequent lack of information
makes it difficult for LDC’s to identify suitable trading partners and prices.
Liquidity is also limited by a coordination problem because the transfer
of the gas itself must be linked to a contract for the necessary pipeline
transportation capacity. These search and coordination problems are
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particularly acute in the spot market, in which there is only one day to
consummate a trade, although they are present at bidweek as well. Because
of these barriers to trade, an LDC can occasionally find itself facing few
suitable counterparties in its local market, leading to situations in which
it can have market power exercised against it. Industry participants have
also told us that instances may occur in which an LDC cannot complete a
transaction at any price, particularly in the spot market.
III(ii). Incentives for Inaction in ‘Tight’ Gas Markets
We focus our analysis on the decisions of LDC’s in the forward bidweek
market. The task of an LDC in this market is to know whether to buy or sell
gas given its initial reserve level, its projected customer demand over the
upcoming month, and its projection of spot prices over the upcoming
month. For example, if an LDC expects to need additional gas and believes
that spot prices are likely to be higher than the price at which it can buy gas
at bidweek, it should purchase bidweek gas.
LDC’s are charged by regulators to be ‘prudent’ in acquiring gas sup-
plies, which means (in very simple terms) that LDC’s should acquire suf-
ficient gas to serve customer demand and not pay too high a price for it.
Regulators enforce this objective with the threat of prudency reviews and
possible reprimands for LDC’s who are determined ex post to have acted
imprudently. The punishment value for LDC’s of regulatory reviews is not
easily specified, nor are punishments written into formal rules, but it is clear
that the LDC’s believe they are real and that their wish to avoid a review
affects the decisions they make.
In particular, industry participants have expressed to us a belief that the
expected regulatory penalty an LDC would face following a curtailment or
a purchase of gas at an extremely high spot price varies with the inference
the regulator would draw regarding why the incident happened. One utility
executive told us with regard to this issue that ‘[avoiding] regret is the prime
mover’ in dealing with regulators. If an LDC is forced to purchase gas at
extremely high spot prices or, even worse, curtail customers, it would prefer
to be able to argue that it made a ‘good faith effort’ to avert the problem
by buying gas at bidweek but was thwarted by an illiquid market. If the
utility has in fact sold gas during bidweek, it will not be able to make this
argument. Inaction during bidweek therefore protects LDC’s from the risk
of a particularly harsh regulatory review.11
Within the agency relationship between the regulator and the LDC,
the threat of a regulatory review helps ensure that the LDC pursues the
11 A 2001 report published by The National Regulatory Research Institute describes spe-
cific cases in which LDC’s in various states were reprimanded or found to be imprudent for
relying too heavily on spot markets and having to pay high prices for gas as a consequence
(Costello and Cita [2001], pp. 59–62).
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regulator’s prudency objectives. There are also political reasons for using
the threat of a review. The regulator is ultimately accountable to the
governor and legislature, and they in turn are accountable to their constitu-
ents. While high retail rates or curtailments will attract customer ire when-
ever they occur, the political fallout will be greater if the utility has taken
some action that can be interpreted as having caused or contributed to the
bad outcome. (Although the circumstances are quite different, the black-
outs during the California electricity crisis and the subsequent recall of
Governor Gray Davis suggest that a widespread belief that public utilities
have been poorly overseen can have substantial political consequences.)
An LDC can provide itself political ‘cover’ and some protection from
‘Monday-morning quarterbacking’ in a regulatory review of high-priced
spot purchases or curtailments if it at least avoided selling gas in the
preceding bidweek.12
In the simple model of section II, the principal’s incentive to fire the agent
following an incorrect decision stemmed from a rational inference about
the agent’s quality and the fact that the principal’s value is maximized by
hiring a new, potentially higher-skilled, agent. In the natural gas context,
the regulator cannot ‘fire’ an LDC. While individual managers within an
LDC could be fired, we have not found any instances of a PUC calling
directly for the firing of an individual. Of course, career concerns could
arise within the LDC itself, leading an individual manager responsible for
gas procurement not to sell reserves, even at an expected positive value to
the LDC, if there were a possibility that the LDC would subsequently need
to buy the gas back on the spot market and face a prudency review.13 In
what follows, we will focus our discussion on the interaction between the
regulator and the LDC. In this context, the relevant disciplinary actions we
have in mind are not literal firings, but regulatory reviews, reprimands, and
other such institutional—rather than individual—punishments.
An LDC’s concern about regulatory reviews, political fallout, or infer-
ences regarding its ability are likely to only be salient in what are referred
to in the industry as ‘tight’ markets. A ‘tight’ bidweek market is one in
which consumer demand for gas in the upcoming month is expected to be
high relative to the total supply that is available to the LDC’s in the region
(including supplies available to be withdrawn from storage). More pre-
cisely, in a tight bidweek market, LDC’s believe that there is some chance
12 Although this paper models career concerns arising between LDC’s and regulators, it
could also be the case that LDC’s faithfully implement the wishes of regulators but that there
is something analogous to a career concern that arises between regulators and elected officials
or between elected officials and the electorate.
13 Such internal career concerns incentives could also be relevant for other market partici-
pants such as gas marketers, though in that case the incentive conflict would be between the
personal career advancement of an employee and the (unregulated) profit motive of the gas
marketer.
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that the customer demand that will be realized in the upcoming month will
be sufficiently high that LDC’s holding insufficient gas reserves will be
forced to either pay very high spot prices or curtail customers if they cannot
execute a spot purchase. Because of this curtailment risk, tight markets
are naturally associated with high bidweek prices and high expected spot
prices. For example, there were spells of particularly cold weather in
the Northeast in February, 2003, January, 2004, and December, 2004–
January, 2005; record low temperatures were set in Boston in the 2003 and
2004 events. During each of these spells, gas prices in the region increased
substantially in both the bidweek and spot markets.14 The bidweek price
increases can be attributed to either forecasts of further cold weather or
to the depletion of storage volumes during the cold snaps. These price
increases were also partially transmitted to natural gas supply areas such
as Louisiana via the interstate pipeline system. Other examples of tight
markets include California in late 2000 following a period of intense
demand for natural gas by electricity generators (and a supply disruption
caused by an explosion on the El Paso pipeline system) and much of the
eastern half of the U.S. in late 2005 following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Tight markets are also likely to be associated with a high spot price
variance. In a tight market, an LDC’s supplies of gas may be insufficient to
meet consumer demand. Thus, the LDC’s marginal valuation of gas will be
determined by how much gas it needs in order to serve the inelastic demand
of its retail customers, rather than, for example, the value of storing gas for
future months. As a result, the LDC’s demand for gas in the market will
become inelastic. Because the external supply of gas will also be inelastic
due to pipeline capacity constraints, small shocks to customers’ demand
will translate into large spot price movements.
Career concerns are salient in tight bidweek markets because of this high
spot price variance and the threat of curtailments. Even if bidweek prices
are sufficiently high that an LDC believes that selling gas at bidweek is the
value-maximizing decision in expectation, it faces the risk that a positive
demand shock will require it to curtail customers or re-purchase the gas at
a spot price that is much higher than the bidweek price at which it sold.
Inaction in this situation will protect the LDC from a particularly severe
regulatory review and an adverse reputational impact. In a market that is
not tight, however, there is no threat of curtailment and the variance of spot
14 At the Boston ‘citygate’ pricing point, for example, daily spot prices during February,
2003, January, 2004, and January, 2005 regularly exceeded $10 per million British thermal
units (mmBtu) and reached as high as $47.50/mmBtu on January 15th, 2004 when a record
low temperature of -4 degrees Fahrenheit was recorded. Bidweek prices for delivery in March,
2003, February, 2004, and February, 2005 were $11.35, $10.07, and $9.36 per mmBtu,
respectively. In contrast, the bidweek price did not exceed $3.70/mmBtu throughout the
winter of 2001–2002, for which there were only 5 days in which the high temperature was
at or below the freezing point. (Historical weather data were obtained from WeatherSpark.
com.)
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prices will be relatively low. There is therefore very little chance that the
LDC will experience one of the adverse outcomes that the regulator wishes
it to avoid.
Finally, the incentive for inaction in tight markets is likely to be asym-
metric: an LDC will be more concerned about selling in a tight bidweek
market than about buying. If an LDC sells gas, it exposes itself to the risk
of a positive demand shock that could force it to either buy gas at an
extremely high spot price or curtail customers, triggering a regulatory
review. If the LDC instead buys gas at bidweek, it is exposed to the risk of
a negative demand shock in which the spot price will fall below the bidweek
price. In this scenario, however, the LDC will not be forced to reveal its
(ex post) error by selling gas at spot. It can instead simply undertake no
spot transaction and therefore avoid openly ‘buying high and selling low.’15
Furthermore, this downside risk scenario imposes no risk of a curtail-
ment.16 An LDC’s willingness to buy gas in bidweek markets should not
therefore be substantially affected by incentives for inaction, even in tight
market situations.
IV. MARKET IMPLICATIONS OF CAREER CONCERNS IN TIGHT MARKETS
In order to consider the effect of inaction on market outcomes, we first
describe how prices and volumes are determined in the bidweek and spot
markets. At any point in time, LDC’s will have different marginal values of
the reserves they hold, which stem from differences in their initial reserve
levels, expected local end-use demand, costs of storage, and future price
projections. These differences drive trade in the bidweek and spot markets.
In a market in which available supplies are ample relative to expected
upcoming demand—that is, a market that is not tight—there is essentially
zero near-term risk of curtailments or substantial price volatility. In this
case, an arbitrage condition will bind between these markets, and the
bidweek price should be approximately equal to the expected spot price,
consistent with the weak-form efficient markets hypothesis.
In a tight market, however, LDC’s that have career concerns will be less
willing to sell gas during bidweek; they may prefer inaction. The impact
of a threat of regulatory punishment is similar to a tax on forward sales of
gas, increasing sellers’ reservation values. Thus, career concerns cause
15 Even if the regulator later observes from market survey data (such as that used in this
paper) that the spot price was lower than the bidweek price paid by the LDC, the LDC can
claim that the spot market was illiquid and that, had it purchased gas at spot instead, it would
have been forced to pay a price similar to the bidweek price.
16 A final reason for asymmetry arises because, if the regulatory punishment is convex in the
absolute difference between the bidweek price and the spot price, the right-skewed distribu-
tion of spot prices implies that the expected punishment from positive demand shocks is
greater than the expected punishment from negative demand shocks.
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transactions that would otherwise be Pareto-improving not to occur, cre-
ating a deadweight loss. The upward (or inward) shift in the bidweek gas
supply curve increases the bidweek price and reduces the quantity of
bidweek gas traded.17 These two implications of career concerns and inac-
tion form the basis of our empirical analysis. We will test whether it is the
case that in tight markets, bidweek prices systematically exceed expected
spot prices and whether the volumes of gas traded in tight bidweek markets
are lower than volumes traded in bidweek markets that are not tight.18
Before we describe our empirical approach to estimating these effects,
it is useful to consider whether factors other than career concerns could
explain forward price premia and low transactions volumes in tight
markets. There are several reasons apart from career concerns that forward
price premia might arise. First, the illiquidity of spot markets suggests
that an LDC would rather pay a premium at bidweek to ‘lock in’ gas supply
over the upcoming month than rely on the spot market to respond to
demand shocks and avoid curtailments. The industry refers to this prefer-
ence as a concern for ‘security of supply;’ it is similar to stockout risk in
other contexts. In equilibrium, security of supply concerns will lead to
forward price premia in tight markets. Forward premia may also arise
purely from price risk aversion if LDC’s buying gas during bidweek are
more risk-averse over money than are sellers.19 Under price risk aversion,
buying gas during a tight bidweek market provides insurance against spot
prices that will have a high variance over the upcoming month.
Both the pure security of supply story and the price risk aversion story
are distinct from the career concerns and inaction story in that they do not
involve asymmetric incentives for selling gas during bidweek relative to
buying gas or doing nothing. Thus, the bidweek reservation price at which
an LDC affected by security of supply concerns or price risk aversion will
be willing to sell gas will be the same as the reservation price at which the
LDC will be willing to buy. In the absence of a wedge between sellers’ and
buyers’ reservation values, there is no obvious reason why a pure security
of supply concern or price risk aversion should systematically lead to a
reduction in transaction volumes in tight markets. (For a more complete
discussion of these effects, see Borenstein, Busse, and Kellogg [2007].)
17 An inward shift in the bidweek demand is not likely to result from career concerns, as
explained above. If such a shift did occur, it would also reduce bidweek volume but would
tend to lower bidweek prices relative to spot rather than raise them.
18 For example, returning to the Northeast cold spells noted above, we find that bidweek
prices substantially exceeded realized spot prices in each instance. During the December,
2004–January, 2005 cold spell, Platts actually recorded zero bidweek transactions at the
Boston citygate for delivery in January. (While we do not believe that this zero is a data error,
our empirical analysis excludes such zeros in order to be conservative.) We do not have
volume data on the earlier cold spells since Platts did not record volume data during that
period, as discussed in section V below.
19 This explanation is undermined somewhat by the fact that the same firms are bidweek
sellers in some months and buyers in other months.
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Moreover, there are several additional reasons to think that, in the
absence of career concerns, bidweek market volumes should actually
increase when spot markets are expected to be tight. The first reason is a
scale effect: tight local gas markets are associated with cold weather and
higher-than-normal volumes of gas deliveries to end consumers. This
increase in delivery volume will tend to scale up the volumes that need to be
traded in order to equate marginal valuations across firms. That is, if the
volumes of initial reserves that are misallocated across firms (relative to
their desired reserves for the upcoming month) increase with the total level
of consumption in the market, then the forward quantity traded should
increase in tight markets.
Second, trading volumes will increase in tight markets if market tightness
is associated with increased heterogeneity of LDCs’ demand levels. An
increase in heterogeneity may arise through an increase in the variability of
firms’ demands, driven by uncertainty over demand shocks that potentially
affect the LDC’s in an area non-uniformly. Uncertainty about weather and
customer demand that exists prior to the bidweek market, but is partially
resolved by bidweek, will increase the level of misallocation that LDC’s
wish to correct through forward trading. Misallocation is likely to be
greater in tight gas markets than in non-tight markets that are generally
associated with relatively low local demand uncertainty.
Finally, the presence of transaction costs should also lead to higher
trading volumes in tight markets. For a given quantity of misallocated
reserves, the gains from reallocation are likely to be greater in a tight
market. In a non-tight market, most LDC’s operate in a fairly elastic
region of their marginal valuation curve, implying that the gains from
most potential trades will be small relative to the gains from trade in a
tight market. Thus, if there are transaction costs of trading reserves, they
will impede fewer trades in tight markets, leading to greater trading
volumes.
While none of these three effects—scale, heterogeneity and transaction
costs—decisively predicts how the quantity of gas traded in forward
markets will behave in the absence of career concerns, each effect clearly
tilts in the direction of greater forward transaction volumes in tight
markets. The three effects taken together imply that it is unlikely that the
security of supply or price risk aversion models alone would explain
decreases in forward trading in tight markets. Thus, we may differentiate
between inaction and these alternative models by empirically examining the
relationship between bidweek trading volume and market tightness.
If career concerns do decrease trading volumes in tight markets, the
welfare impact is likely to be particularly negative because tight markets are
associated with inelastic demand and supply. Thus, the gains from trade are
likely to be particularly large and preemption of those trades particularly
costly.
CAREER CONCERNS, INACTION AND MARKET INEFFICIENCY 235
© 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics
V. DATA
We obtained all natural gas market price and trading volume data from
Platts’ GASdat product. These data consist of location-specific observa-
tions in the day-ahead (spot) markets and the forward month (bidweek)
markets, and are available from February, 1993, through March, 2008.
Data are reported for more than 100 locations, each of which is a node on
a pipeline where gas can be delivered to a local market or injected into the
pipeline from a producing area. Platts obtains daily spot market prices and
volumes via surveys of trades made at each location. The reported daily
price at each location is the volume-weighted average price of reported
trades. Bidweek data occur on a monthly basis, and Platts’ bidweek prices
represent the volume-weighted average price of all surveyed trades at each
location during bidweek.20 Bidweek takes place over the last five trading
days of each month and consists of trades for gas to be delivered during the
following month. Because our aim is to relate bidweek prices and volumes
to spot prices, we average the daily spot data within each month so that
they are compatible with the monthly bidweek data.21
The years and months covered by the spot price data vary by location.
For example, data for Henry Hub in Louisiana span 1993 to 2008 while
data at the Carthage Hub in northeast Texas are only available for 1997 to
2002. These variations in coverage occur because trading activity in some
locations varies over time, and Platts does not record observations when
there are an insufficient number of trades to allow it to determine the
average price. There also exist missing observations within the coverage
period of each location: 4.8 per cent of all possible spot price observations
is missing. To avoid distortions when calculating average monthly spot
prices, we eliminate from the data locations for which more than 1 per cent
of observations is missing. These dropped locations are characterized by
low transactions volumes and comprise one-fourth of the locations in the
data.
Within the bidweek data, coverage similarly varies by location. Data for
September, 2007, are missing for all but one location, and we drop this
month from the data. Amongst the remaining bidweek location-months that
overlap with spot market observations at non-dropped locations, bidweek
prices are observed for 99.3 per cent of all possible location-months.
A merge of the bidweek and spot price data yields a dataset containing
9,496 location-months for which both spot and bidweek prices exist, spread
20 Platts will sometimes use the median of reported prices if it finds that one high-volume
transaction skews its bidweek sample. Unfortunately, there are no indicators in the data to
determine which observations are computed in this way.
21 We use an unweighted average of the daily spot prices rather than a volume-weighted
average because the unweighted average better reflects the nature of bidweek transactions,
which specify a fixed volume of gas to be delivered every day of the month.
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over 98 locations.22 Summary statistics for the spot and bidweek prices are
shown in table I. Both data series are highly right-skewed, as indicated by
the excess of the mean over the median prices and by the large observed
maximum prices. The summary statistics of the spot and bidweek prices are
very similar, and the difference in means of 0.2 cents per million British
thermal units (mmBtu) is not statistically significant.23 Thus, on average,
there is no statistically discernible forward premium or discount in prices
for natural gas.
Platts reports the volume of gas traded during bidweek at each market
location from June, 1999 to March, 2008, with a gap in coverage from July,
2002 to June, 2004.24 There exist 4,410 location-months, spread over 74
locations, for which bidweek volume, bidweek price, and spot price data
exist.25,26 Summary statistics for bidweek volumes are given in table I. In
our empirical specifications, we will use the logarithm of volume to avoid
22 The count of 9,496 location-months includes only those observations for which recursive
regression spot price predictions can ultimately be generated, as discussed in section VI below.
Without this restriction, there are 15,620 location-months.
23 Statistical significance was tested via a paired t-test with standard errors two-way
clustered on location and month-of-sample: the t-statistic is 0.05.
24 This gap occurs due to a changeover in publications by Platts, prompted by its merger
with FT Energy in 2001. While prices are reported for these dates, volumes are not. In
addition, there are a further 147 observations outside of these dates during which prices are
reported but not volumes.
25 The 4,410 observations do not include 46 location-months for which we observe a
bidweek volume of zero. We drop these observations because our empirical specification uses
the logarithm of bidweek volume, and a tobit specification is impractical and subject to the
incidental parameters problem given the large number of fixed effects used (Neyman and
Scott [1948], Greene [2004]). We have examined an alternative specification in which we code
the observations with zero volume as having a volume of one million cubic feet, the lowest
volume observed in the data. This approach yields estimated bidweek volume effects that are
slightly stronger in magnitude than those discussed below.
26 We have also estimated our price regressions using the 4,410 observations we use for the
volume regressions rather than the 9,496 observation results reported in the paper. We obtain
comparable results with the smaller subset.
TABLE I
SPOT AND BIDWEEK DATA SUMMARY STATISTICS
Number of
observations
Number of
locations Median Mean
Std
Dev Min Max
Bidweek Price ($/mmBtu) 9496 98 3.09 4.01 2.47 0.84 19.76
Spot Price ($/mmBtu) 9496 98 3.01 4.01 2.41 0.87 23.96
Bidweek Volume (million
cubic ft/day)
4410 74 338 538 582 1 4992
Spot volume (million
cubic ft/day)
4324 69 352 557 690 0.807 8139
Notes: Price data cover February, 1993, through March, 2008. Volume data cover June, 1999, through
March, 2008. Reported spot volumes are averages within each location-month. Volume data are reported in
whole numbers; thus, the minimum bidweek volume is 1 without further significant figures. mmBtu denote
millions of British thermal units.
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scaling problems associated with the fact that some locations generally see
much larger volumes than others: average volumes at each location range
from 4 million cubic feet per day to approximately 1,300 million cubic feet
per day.
VI. EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK AND OPERATIONALIZATION OF
MARKET ‘TIGHTNESS’
Our theory of career concerns and inaction yields two implications for
natural gas markets: (1) bidweek prices will exceed expected spot prices in
tight markets; and (2) bidweek volumes will be lower in tight markets than
in markets that are not tight. A natural measure of tightness is the expected
spot price of natural gas. Tight bidweek markets are defined as cases in
which LDCs’ expected spot demand for gas is high relative to available
supply, a condition that naturally leads to an increase in the expected spot
price. We therefore aim to test our hypotheses by estimating the parameters
of the following equations:
(1) BidWeek Spot E Spot f tit it it i it− = + [ ]+ + ( )+β β μ ε0 1 .
(2) ln .Volume E Spot g tit it i it( ) = + [ ]+ + ( )+γ γ ν η0 1
Here, BidWeekit is the price during bidweek of month t-1 for gas to be
delivered at location i in month t, Volumeit is the trading volume during the
bidweek of month t-1 at location i, and Spotit is the average daily spot price
for gas at location iover month t.E[Spotit] is the expectation at the beginning
of bidweek in month t-1 ofSpotit. Themi and ni are location fixed effects, and
f(t) and g(t) are 8th-order Chebychev polynomials in time that control for the
secular upward trend in natural gas prices over the sample period.27 If
forward price premia arise in tight markets, then b1 will be positive. If
forward volumes are lower in tight markets, then g1 will be negative.
In order to estimate equations [1] and [2] directly, we would have to
observe E[Spotit]. Because we do not observe market participants’ expec-
tations of spot prices for a particular month, we must take an indirect
approach. We begin by noting that market participants are experienced,
professional traders and should therefore have spot price expectations that
are unbiased predictors of the actual spot price. Thus, any new information
that becomes available after expectations are formed will be orthogonal to
the information that is incorporated into the expected spot price:
(3) Spot E Spot E Spotit it it it it= [ ]+ ⊥ [ ]ξ ξ,
27 We have also estimated all equations using 6th and 10th order polynomials; doing so
does not substantially change the reported results.
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Using equation [3], we can estimate equations [1] and [2] by substituting
Spotit for E[Spotit] and accounting for the endogeneity introduced by xit:
(4) BidWeek Spot Spot f tit it it i it it− = + + + ( )+ −( )β β μ ε β ξ0 1 1 .
(5) ln .Volume Spot g tit it i it it( ) = + + + ( )+ −( )γ γ ν η γ ξ0 1 1
Using Spotit as a right-hand-side regressor introduces classical measure-
ment error in both [4] and [5] and simultaneity bias in [4]. In order to use
Spotit as a regressor, we need an instrument that is correlated with the
realized spot price but uncorrelated with the errors (eit - b1xit) and
(hit - g1xit).
As an instrument, we construct a forecast of the spot market price that is
based on information available to us and determined prior to the bidweek
market in period t-1.28 To illustrate our approach, suppose we wish to
forecast the spot price at the Chicago Citygate in November, 2001, using
information available to traders at the start of bidweek in October (October
bidweek is when forward contracts are set for delivery in November). We
cannot, of course, use the bidweek price itself to create the forecast, as our
aim is to test for a premium in the bidweek price during tight market
periods. Instead, we construct the forecast using two additional pieces of
information: (1) the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) futures
price of gas at Henry Hub, Louisiana, for delivery in November 2001,
priced at the start of bidweek;29 and (2) the spot price differential from
Henry Hub to Chicago, also priced at the start of bidweek. The former
yields a measure of the expected price of gas at Henry Hub in November,
which will be correlated with November prices nationwide, while the latter
measures the price differential to Chicago near the end of October, which
will be correlated with the price differential in November. Because of the
deep liquidity of both the NYMEX futures market and the Henry Hub spot
market, and because the majority of NYMEX market participants have no
intention of taking physical delivery of gas, NYMEX futures prices are not
subject to security of supply or career concerns that might drive a forward
price premium in tight markets. Thus, we may use the NYMEX futures
market to generate unbiased forecasts of Henry Hub spot prices.
More generally, for all locations and months in our data, we forecast the
expected spot price for location i in month t using equation [6] below, in
which FutureHH.t is the NYMEX futures price for delivery at Henry Hub in
28 As an alternative to our instrumental variables approach, we could replace E[Spotit] in
equation [1] directly with our forecast of spot price. However, doing so would cause the
estimated standard errors to be biased downwards (Murphy and Topel [1985]).
29 A NYMEX futures contract specifies a price for delivery of gas for a calendar month at
the Henry Hub pipeline interconnect and storage facility in Louisiana.
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month t, taken at the start of bidweek in month t-1; Spoti,t-1 is the spot
price at location i at the start of bidweek in month t-1; and di is a location
fixed effect.
(6) SpotForecast a a Future a Spot Spotit HH t i t HenryHub t= + + −− −0 1 2 1, , , 1[ ]+ di
To use equation [6] to predict expected spot prices, we must first estimate
the equation’s parameters—a0, a1, a2, and the di’s—by running the regres-
sion specified in equation 7 below. This equation includes an unobserved
orthogonal disturbance nit to account for information revealed between the
start of bidweek in month t-1 and month t.
(7) Spot Future Spot Spotit HH t i t HenryHub t i= + + −[ ]+ +− −α α α δ ν0 1 2 1 1, , , it
In the process of estimating equation [7] and then generating forecasts
using equation [6], we take care to avoid using any future information in
our forecasts. That is, when we forecast the spot price for month t using
equation [6], we use parameters that are estimated using only information
revealed prior to month t-1. This means that we do not use our entire
sample of spot price information to produce estimates of the a’s and di’s
from equation [7], and then apply these estimated parameters to generate a
full time series of prices from equation [6].
Instead, we estimate equation [7] using recursive regressions. Rather
than estimate a single set of αˆ ’s, we estimate a different coefficient vector
ˆ ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆα α α α δt t t t t= ( )0 1 2 for each month t using data only up to month t - 2.
These coefficients are then substituted for the corresponding a’s and d’s in
equation [6] to generate expected spot prices for month t. While this
approach ensures that our spot price prediction for any month t does not
include any information revealed after t, it does come with the cost that
there are few observations with which to estimate equation [7] in the early
part of our sample. To avoid generating estimates based upon only a
handful of points, we predict spot prices only for locations and months
for which the coefficient vector in [7] was estimated using at least 24
observations.30
Results from the estimation of equation [7] are summarized in Table II.
For illustration, the first column of this table reports results using the full
sample of spot price data. The estimated coefficients on the NYMEX
future price and the spot price differential are positive, as expected, and
30 There is a tradeoff in setting the minimum number of observations required to estimate
equation [7]: a high minimum number yields more precise predictions of spot prices but
reduces the total number of predictions and therefore the number of observations in the main
specifications, equations [4] and [5]. The primary results concerning forward price premia and
trading quantities in local natural gas markets do not qualitatively change as we adjust the
minimum number, even when we increase it to 48 months.
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statistically significant. Standard errors for these estimates and all estimates
discussed below are two-way clustered on location and month-of-sample to
allow for arbitrary serial correlation of the residuals within each location
and arbitrary cross-sectional correlation of monthly residuals across loca-
tions (Cameron, Gelbach and Miller [2011]).31 This result indicates that the
NYMEX futures price and the spot price differential carry useful informa-
tion with which to predict current prices.
Table II also reports the results of recursive regressions of equation
[7]. We ran 182 regressions to generate parameters for the forecast of spot
prices from February, 1993, to March, 2008. The estimated coefficient on
the NYMEX future price is positive in every regression, and the estimated
coefficient on the price differential is positive for 180 of 182. We use these
estimated parameters to forecast spot prices using equation [6] and then use
these forecasts as instruments for the spot price in our main specifications,
equations [4] and [5].
Before proceeding with estimating equations [4] and [5], we first verify
empirically that our measure of market tightness is correlated with an
important feature of tight markets: a high spot price variance. As discussed
in Section III, in a tight gas market both demand and supply for gas should
be relatively inelastic, implying that supply and demand shocks occurring
between the bidweek and spot markets should drive large changes in the
spot price relative to its expectation at bidweek. We operationalize this
intuition by estimating equation [8] below, in which we instrument for
Spotit using SpotForecastit. If high expected spot markets are associated
with tight markets, l1 should be positive. ri and h(t) denote location fixed
effects and an 8th-order Chebychev polynomial in time.
31 Throughout all our estimates, allowing for cross-sectional correlation substantially
increases the estimated standard errors while allowing for serial correlation has only a mild
impact.
TABLE II
FULL SAMPLE AND RECURSIVE REGRESSION RESULTS FOR DETERMINANTS OF SPOT PRICE
Full
Sample
Results
Mean Coef Over
Valid RR Predictions
(182 regressions)
Std Deviation of Coef
Over Vaid RR Predictions
(182 regressions)
Henry Hub (HH) future price 0.8796 0.8637 0.0671
(0.0527)
Location to HH spot price
differential
0.3375 0.2905 0.1028
(0.1043)
N 13,848 — —
Notes: Unit of observation is a location-month. ‘Spot price’ denotes the average of daily spot prices for the
month. Regressors ‘HH future price’ and ‘Location to HH spot price differential’ are taken at the start of
bidweek the month prior to that corresponding to the spot price dependent variable. Regressions include
location fixed effects. Values in parentheses indicate standard errors two-way clustered on location and
month-of-sample. Units for all prices are $/mmBtu (millions of British thermal units).
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(8) ln Spot SpotForecast Spot h tit it it i it it−( )( ) = + + + ( )+ −2 0 1 1λ λ ρ ε λ ξ( ).
The estimate of equation [8] is given in column 1 of table III. The esti-
mate of l1 is 0.817 and statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. The
interpretation of this coefficient is that a one dollar increase in the expected
spot price is associated with an increase in the variance of the realized spot
price by a factor of 2.26. The within-location standard deviation of
ln((Spotit - SpotForecastit)2) is equal to 2.62, so this estimated effect is
economically significant.
Column 2 of Table III verifies that this result is not purely driven by
seasonality by adding month-of-year fixed effects to the specification. The
estimate of l1 changes little as a result. Column 3 allows for a linear
location-specific time trend, column 4 allows for location-specific month-
of-year effects, and column 5 allows for both a location-specific time trend
and location-specific month-of-year effects. The interpretation of the esti-
mate of l1 is essentially the same in each specification: the variance of the
spot price is higher when the spot price is expected to be high. These last
results verify that the increase in spot price variance in tight markets is not
merely a seasonal phenomenon, nor is it driven by location-specific secular
trends.32
VII. ESTIMATION RESULTS
VII(i). Forward Price Premia
The results of estimating equation [4] are reported in Table IV. The results
presented in column 1 are those obtained through the estimation of [4] as
32 Results of this regression and those discussed below are also essentially unchanged when
location-specific 2nd or 4th-order polynomial time trends are allowed for.
TABLE III
DETERMINANTS OF THE VARIANCE OF THE SPOT PRICE. DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS
LOG((REALIZED SPOT PRICE—RECURSIVE REGRESSION PREDICTED SPOT PRICE)2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Spot price (instrumented with recursive
regression prediction)
0.8172 0.7515 0.7463 0.7551 0.7499
(0.1853) (0.1789) (0.1830) (0.1773) (0.1812)
Location fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
8th order polynomial in year-month Y Y Y Y Y
Month-of-year fixed effects N Y Y Y Y
Linear time trend * location fixed effects N N Y N Y
Month-of-year * location fixed effects N N N Y Y
Nnumber of observations 9496 9496 9496 9496 9496
Notes: Unit of observation is a location-month. ‘Spot price’ denotes the average of daily spot prices for the
month. Values in parentheses indicate standard errors two-way clustered on location and month-of-sample.
Units for all prices are $/mmBtu (millions of British thermal units).
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written. Columns 2 through 5 follow the same progression as in Table III in
adding additional controls for overall and location-specific seasonality and
time trends. Across all five specifications, we estimate that the forward
premium of bidweek prices over spot prices increases systematically with
the expected spot price. The point estimates indicate that a $1.00 rise in
the expected spot price is predicted to cause a $0.25 to $0.27 rise in the
forward premium, depending on the specification.33 The p-values for the
results in columns 1 through 5 vary from 0.022 (columns 4 and 5) to 0.041
(column 1).
These results provide evidence of forward price premia in local natural
gas markets at times and locations in which these markets are tight. This
finding suggests that natural gas markets are not frictionless, liquid, risk-
less markets. At a minimum, when markets are tight, arbitrage between
forward and spot markets fails to bring forward prices into equality with
expected spot prices. In section IV, we discussed several factors that could
lead to this forward premium: career concerns, security of supply, and price
risk aversion. While a forward price premium is consistent with all three of
these explanations, only career concerns are likely to lead to a reduced
volume of transactions when markets are tight. Therefore we attempt next
33 The existence of forward premia in tight markets does not contradict the finding that
there is no forward premium on average (Table I) because tight markets are uncommon
events. The distribution of predicted spot prices—after taking out the 8th order polynomial
time trend and fixed effects—is highly right-skewed, and realizations in the far-right tail are
required in order to yield expected forward premia. To have an expected forward-spot
premium in the top 5% of the forward-spot differential distribution—an expected premium
of at least $0.94—the results in Table III, column 1 suggest that the expected spot price
would have to be at least $3.44. Such high expected prices occur only 3% of the time in the
distribution of expected spot prices obtained from our recursive regressions. When these 3%
of observations are dropped from the data, the average forward-spot price differential
amongst the remaining observations is still statistically indistinct from zero (the average
differential is -$0.053 with a standard error of $0.044).
TABLE IV
DETERMINANTS OF FORWARD-SPOT PRICE DIFFERENTIAL. DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS THE
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE BIDWEEK PRICE AND SPOT PRICE FOR EACH DELIVERY MONTH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Spot price (instrumented with recursive
regression prediction)
0.2720 0.2603 0.2648 0.2545 0.2591
(0.1332) (0.1142) (0.1163) (0.1109) (0.1130)
Location fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
8th order polynomial in year-month Y Y Y Y Y
Month-of-year fixed effects N Y Y Y Y
Linear time trend * location fixed effects N N Y N Y
Month-of-year * location fixed effects N N N Y Y
Number of observations 9496 9496 9496 9496 9496
Notes: Unit of observation is a location-month. ‘Spot price’ denotes the average of daily spot prices for the
month. Values in parentheses indicate standard errors two-way clustered on location and month-of-sample.
Units for all prices are $/mmBtu (millions of British thermal units).
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to distinguish amongst these theories, or at least assess which is dominant,
by examining data on forward trading volumes in markets that are tight
versus volumes in markets that are not tight.
VII(ii). Forward Trading Volumes
Column 1 of Table V reports the results of estimating equation [5] with the
bidweek volume data. The estimated coefficient on the spot price demon-
strates that forward trading volumes are significantly lower in tight
markets. A $1.00 increase in the expected spot price is predicted to decrease
the logarithm of forward trading volume by 0.093, equivalent to a decrease
in volume of 8.9%. The effect is statistically significant at the 1% level and
is robust to the addition of additional controls for overall and location-
specific seasonality and time trends.
An alternative explanation for these forward volume results is that
natural gas trading simply becomes more difficult when markets are
tight. For example, it may be that it becomes difficult to physically con-
summate a trade when the gas delivery infrastructure is near its capa-
city. However, if such a transactions cost story explains the decrease in
forward trading volumes when markets are tight, then we should also
observe that spot trading volumes also decrease when markets are tight.
The inaction model, on the other hand, does not imply decreases in spot
trades. Thus, we can use data on spot trading volumes to distinguish these
two explanations.34
Platts’ spot market data provides observations of daily spot trading
volumes, and we average these volumes within each location-month to
generate monthly time series of spot market volumes at each location. For
34 Another alternative hypothesis is that the correlation of shocks across utilities increases
in tight markets, lowering transactions volumes. Under this hypothesis, volumes should
decrease in both bidweek and spot markets, not just bidweek markets.
TABLE V
DETERMINANTS OF LOG(BIDWEEK TRADING VOLUME)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Spot price (instrumented with recursive
regression prediction)
-0.0931 -0.0956 -0.0837 -0.0961 -0.0830
(0.0232) (0.0213) (0.0206) (0.0217) (0.0211)
Location fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
8th order polynomial in year-month Y Y Y Y Y
Month-of-year fixed effects N Y Y Y Y
Linear time trend * location fixed effects N N Y N Y
Month-of-year * location fixed effects N N N Y Y
Number of observations 4410 4410 4410 4410 4410
Notes: Unit of observation is a location-month. ‘Spot price’ denotes the average of daily spot prices for the
month. Values in parentheses indicate standard errors two-way clustered on location and month-of-sample.
Units for all prices are $/mmBtu (millions of British thermal units).
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comparability to the bidweek volume results, we use only location-months
for which bidweek volume data are also available. Spot volumes were not
recorded at 5 of these locations; the spot volume dataset therefore consists
of 4,324 observations spread over 69 locations.35 Summary statistics for
spot volumes are given in Table I; these volumes are of similar magnitudes
to those in the bidweek market.
We examine the behavior of spot market volumes in tight markets by
estimating equation [9] below. In estimating [9], we do not instrument for
Spotit using SpotForecastit because we are interested the behavior of trading
volumes during the spot market itself rather than the forward bidweek
market. Thus, the actual spot price is the appropriate measure of market
tightness rather than the ex ante expected spot price.
(9) ln SpotVolume Spot h tit it i it( ) = + + + ( )+θ θ φ ω0 1
Table VI presents the results of estimating [9], along with alternative
specifications that control for overall and location-specific seasonality
and time trends. In every specification, the point estimate of q1 is positive,
small in magnitude, and statistically insignificant. The estimated confi-
dence intervals rule out that a $1.00 increase in the spot price is associ-
ated with a decrease in spot volumes of more than 1%. These results
suggest that the decreases in forward volumes observed in tight markets
(table V) are unlikely to be explained by factors related to increased
transactions costs, since such factors would presumably impact spot
markets as well.36
35 The bidweek volume results are essentially unchanged when estimated using this smaller,
matched dataset.
36 If [9] is estimated while instrumenting for Spotit using our forecast of Spotit, the estimated
effect is slightly negative, not statistically different from zero, but still statistically different
from the estimated effects reported for bidweek volume.
TABLE VI
DETERMINANTS OF LOG(SPOT TRADING VOLUME)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Spot price 0.0106 0.0128 0.0126 0.0121 0.0119
(0.0085) (0.0091) (0.0089) (0.0099) (0.0098)
Location fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
8th order polynomial in year-month Y Y Y Y Y
Month-of-year fixed effects N Y Y Y Y
Linear time trend * location fixed effects N N Y N Y
Month-of-year * location fixed effects N N N Y Y
Number of observations 4324 4324 4324 4324 4324
Notes: Unit of observation is a location-month. ‘Spot price’ denotes the average of daily spot prices for the
month. Monthly log(spot trading volume) is the average of the daily log(spot trading volume) for the month.
Values in parentheses indicate standard errors two-way clustered on location and month-of-sample. Units for
all prices are $/mmBtu (millions of British thermal units).
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The implication of these results is that trade in forward markets is
reduced when spot prices are expected to be high. This outcome suggests
that there is a market inefficiency at work: forward markets shrink at the
very time they are most needed. These reductions in forward quantities
traded are consistent with the inaction model in which the regulator penal-
izes supply shortfalls caused by forward sales more than shortfalls caused
by insufficient forward purchases. Absent the behavior caused by this
regulatory asymmetry, a model of security of supply concerns alone would
not predict the observed effects, nor would a model of price-risk aversion.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND BROADER RELEVANCE
We have presented a model of natural gas procurement by regulated utili-
ties in which career concerns between the utilites and their regulators lead
to an incentive for inaction in forward natural gas markets. In particular, in
‘tight’ market situations in which customer demand is expected to be high
in the near-term, career concerns can lead a utility to be unwilling to sell gas
in the forward market, even when the forward price exceeds the expected
spot price over the upcoming month. This incentive for inaction derives
from the possibility that a positive demand shock might force the utility to
buy gas in the spot market at an extremely high price or even curtail its
customers. When such an outcome can be linked to a sale of gas in the
forward market, it will diminish the utility’s reputation and may lead to a
particularly harsh punishment by the regulator.
When several utilities in an area face career concerns and incentives for
inaction, a forward price premium and a decrease in forward trade result.
The incentive for inaction and commensurate reduction in trade is most
salient in tight gas markets, as we verify empirically. Unfortunately, it is in
such situations that trade is most valuable: demand is expected to be high
and there may be a large increase in social surplus from transferring gas to
those utilities that value it most.
As career concerns and problems of essential input procurement are
hardly unique to the natural gas industry, we suspect that incentives for
inaction may exist in other settings as well. Agents’ responses to these
incentives in aggregate can have significant market repercussions. For
example, a procurement agent within a firm may carry excess inventories
of inputs so (s)he can never be blamed for a disruption in the production
process. In aggregate, this behavior would distort allocation of the inputs
among input customers. Likewise, an agent might stick to historical sourc-
ing when a new vendor would have higher expected value for the firm
(‘nobody ever got fired for buying IBM’). Again, in aggregate such behav-
ior could make it difficult for a new input supplier to enter the market.
Finally, human resource managers in an industry might prefer to select
excessively conventional job candidates, thereby in aggregate discouraging
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people of less conventional talents or backgrounds from investing in the
skills to enter the industry.
The imposition of particularly harsh penalties for observable actions that
can be linked to negative outcomes may be efficient from the principal’s
point of view, suggesting that rational managers in an organization may be
willing to apply them. However, we demonstrate that the impacts of these
incentives extend beyond the principal-agent relationship in which they
are applied and can cause significant market inefficiencies. In markets for
necessary inputs, the career concerns generated by these principal-agent
relationships can cause firms to be reluctant to engage in trades, even when
differences in marginal valuations are significant.
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